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AGAINST PROGRESS:
INTERVENTIONS ABOUT EQUALITY IN
SUPREME COURT CASES ABOUT
COPYRIGHT LAW
JESSICA SILBEY*
This essay is adapted from a book I am writing called Against
Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet
Age.1 The book’s primary argument is that, with the rise of digital
technology and the ubiquity of the internet, intellectual property law is
becoming a mainstream part of law and culture. Also, IP’s
mainstreaming in the late-20th century exposes on-going debates about
“progress of science and the useful arts,” which is the constitutional
purpose of intellectual property rights.2
Today, it is unexceptional to read about intellectual property law on
the front page of mainstream newspapers or for intellectual property to
be the subject of popular television shows.3 Intellectual property law is
now a central part of legal education, with law schools building
intellectual property and technology law research and advocacy centers
to highlight the importance of the field in contemporary legal practice.4
Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on intellectual property cases at a rate that is more
*
Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law; Faculty Director, Center for
Law, Innovation and Creativity (CLIC). This essay is part of a larger project funded with a
Guggenheim Fellowship in 2018. Many thanks to the organizers and participants of the 10th annual
Supreme Court IP Review at Chicago-Kent College of Law and to the student editors of the ChicagoKent Journal of Intellectual Property.
1. JESSICA SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE INTERNET
AGE (forthcoming 2021).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See Silicon Valley: Seasons 1-6 (HBO television broadcast 2013-2019).
4. See Steven Brachmann, The State of IP Education Worldwide: Seven Leading Nations, prepared
for
The
Center
for
IP
Understanding
(2018),
pp.
1,
3,
available
at
https://www.understandingip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CIPU-State-of-IP-EducationWorldwide-SB-BB.pdf.
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than double previous decades.5 Intellectual property’s “domestication”
into everyday legal and popular culture signals its probable reshaping
and repurposing of the “progress” towards which intellectual property
aims in ways that may be far afield from original foundations.
In brief, Against Progress describes how in the 20th century
intellectual property legal doctrine and scholarship focused on
economic models of progress, which were framed in terms of wealth
accumulation and market theories facilitating economic growth.6 The
rise of digital technology that facilitates all sorts of copying at the turn of
the century puts pressure on the anti-copying regulations defining
intellectual property. Combine this technological development with the
focus on economic rationales and incentive-based reasons for exclusive
rights, and federal intellectual property rights expand and broaden to
regulate more of the behavior that technology enables. The result was an
increase in the amount of intellectual property itself: more copyrighted
works, more patents and more trademarks.7
Despite expanding scope and the rise of “more” intellectual
property, Against Progress demonstrates that turn-of-the century
intellectual property practice challenges the “progress as more”
paradigm. Through various methodological interventions – close
reading of cases, doctrinal analysis, and various qualitative empirical
methods – Against Progress demonstrates how contemporary accounts
of intellectual property are not primarily anchored by claims of “more”
or in economic growth terms. Instead, creative and innovative practices
5. See Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater First Amendment
Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 11, 14-15 (2006) (counting cases from 1972
to 2006). From 2006 to 2019, the Supreme Court’s IP case load has continued apace, with 26 patent
cases, 12 copyright cases, and 10 trademark cases.
6. For canonical writing on the economic roots of intellectual property, see generally WILLIAM
LANDES AND RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
7. For scholarship on problems of increasing scope in IP, see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna,
Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2018); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2202 (2016); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
587, 587 (2008). I understand that trademarks are authorized not by the “progress” clause of the
Constitution but by its Commerce Clause. But insofar as progress is measured by “more” in the
twentieth century, more distinctiveness and more competition—trademark law’s hallmarks—are
considered good things too. Trade secret and right of publicity are also relevant intellectual
property doctrines that have expanded in scope over the past several decades. See generally
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018)
(tracing evolution of right of publicity as an expanded right of privacy through the twentieth
century); Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 493-96 (2010)
(discussing evolution of trade secret law from common law to enactment of Uniform Trade Secret
Act). Due to scope and time restraints, I have limited my analysis in the book largely to copyright,
patent, and trademark.
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(and disputes concerning them) revolve around adjacent values and
principles central to our constitutional system such as equality, privacy,
and community or general welfare.
The founders of the United States and its Constitution understood
intellectual property to achieve “progress of science and the useful arts”
by granting authors and inventors durationally limited property-like
rights in their writings and inventions.8 But contemporary
conversations about creative and innovative practices reveal that
exclusivity and property-like rights may degrade not develop
community sustainability.9 In other words, property rights and the
economic models that have sustained them are under critical scrutiny in
the new century by everyday creators and innovators in light of our new
digitally-enabled landscapes. Supplanting economic rights are other
fundamental rights deeply rooted in our constitutional democracy but
which, like economic models of sustainable markets, are also subject to
reconfiguration in our digital age. Against Progress argues that twentyfirst century creativity and innovation and the intellectual property law
that structures it are developing from the new human and digital
networks of the 21st century, which are reinvigorating and reconfiguring
twentieth-century social and political values for our internet age. These
values, such as equality, privacy, and distributive justice, are central to
human dignity and flourishing but have been largely absent from
intellectual property policy. The book describes these debates about
intellectual property over these values as a bellwether of changing social
justice needs in the internet age.
In this short essay, I provide only two examples of the shifting
narratives at play in intellectual property disputes that are refocusing
concerns from economic resource allocation to fundamental values that
ground the rule of law in the United States. These examples are drawn
from the chapter on equality, which traces themes of equal treatment
and substantive equality doctrine through intellectual property cases at
the United States Supreme Court. The below discussion concerns two
controversial copyright cases, but the chapter discusses cases about
patent, trademark, and copyright law.

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8.
9. For an early and by now canonical example of a critique of intellectual property rights and
“Progress of Science and useful Arts,” see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
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I. SUPREME COURT AND EQUALITY DOCTRINE
When the Supreme Court started taking more intellectual property
cases in the 1990s, their decisions were largely unanimous. Although
some milestone decisions were contested and split (for example the
case deciding the legality of the home video recorder was decided 5-410),
most cases then and now were much less contentious than, for example,
cases about criminal law, affirmative action, or federalism. These other
constitutional questions exhibit deep ideological division on the Court
about, e.g., the role of government in ameliorating social inequality
based on race, sex, or sexual orientation. To be sure, the Supreme Court
is more often unanimous than divided on most issues it decides in the
dwindling set of cases on which it grants certiorari.11 But with the
contentious cases concerning the lawfulness of same-sex marriage, antidiscrimination laws and their potential conflict with religious exercise,
as examples,12 the relative unanimity of the justices concerning
intellectual property regulation and its relation to the constitutional
prerogative of “progress of science and the useful arts” is notable.
As the Supreme Court’s intellectual property caseload grows,
however, so does the level of disagreement among the justices. The
disagreements resonate (on the surface at least) with utilitarian and
economic explanations of IP law and policy. Is the IP law at issue
rationally related to achieving its goal of promoting fair competition
(trademark law) and “progress of science and the useful arts” (copyright
and patent law)? Only upon closer look and comparison between cases,
as one might compare texts by the same author tracing phrases,
structure, and influences, does the ascendant priority and significance
emerge of new values other than commercial policy and welfare as a
measure of progress and a fair marketplace. These other values reflect
debates concerning the nature and purpose of equality.

10. Sony Corp v. Universal Studios, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
11. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme
Court, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 769 (2015).
12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (deciding 5-4 that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex couples); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding 5-4 that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows
for-profit companies to deny contraception coverage to employees based on a religious objection);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding 5-4 that Equal Protection Clause does not
prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body).
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When dissents or concurrences arise, at first disagreements appear
to revolve around customary IP-specific concerns such as balancing
exclusive rights with meaningful access to promote a notion of
“progress” defined by more inventions and creativity. But dig further
and this canon of IP-specific Supreme Court case law also debates the
appropriate beneficiaries for legal entitlements, fair opportunities to
those benefits, and the effect of access to and constraints on those
benefits for community wellbeing. In other words, as with all statutes
and constitutional interpretation, the Court fills the semantic gaps and
ambiguities with its perspective on the history and policy of the subject
as related to deeper contemporary socio-cultural themes and
preoccupations. We learn by studying the gap-filling that various
dimensions of equality central to U.S. law and culture influence the
Court’s intellectual property decisions and structure the Court’s
growing disagreements in the intellectual property field.
It is curious that equality concepts frame these decisions when
equality’s rival, liberty, is more fundamentally related to intellectual
property given its power to exclude and restrict. Freedom to do
something, rather than equal treatment with regard to some activity, is
often considered the crux of the intellectual property issue. Equality
presupposes fair distribution or access that frustrates freedom – think
of anti-discrimination laws that mandate access at the expense of the
freedom of the person or entity seeking to discriminate. This kind of
equality would significantly reduce the dominion an IP owner has over
their work. Indeed, until recent Supreme Court decisions from the first
decade of the 21st century changed IP remedy rules,13 the dominant
remedy for IP infringement was an injunction (prohibiting doing
something). This reflects IP’s home in the field of property law, where
remedies reflect and rely upon control and dominance over the more
typical property asset – a car, a home, a bank account. By contrast, legal
claims that result in money damages (often described as the “liability”),
and not an injunction or specific performance to do something, are often
associated with contracts (broken promises) and torts (accidents and
injuries).14 Of course, remedial schemes may be mixed in law. For
example, civil rights disputes include both injunctions and money
13. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding by unanimous court that
permanent injunctions should not always be issued when a patent has been violated and instead
that traditional four-part test for injunctive relief applies in patent law).
14. See generally Guido Calebresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
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damages: a prohibition on the unlawful activity going forward and
compensation for the civil rights injury of the past. In civil rights cases,
we may understandably reject thinking of liberty and equality as
forming a zero-sum relationship: is the right to be free from racial
segregation a wrongful lack of freedom for the segregationist or a
rightful benefit for the equality of those previously segregated? But in
some contemporary cases concerning the “right to discriminate” in
public accommodations – for example refusing to bake a gay couple’s
wedding cake – the liberty-equality trade-off has returned.15
And this is true with the Supreme Court cases about intellectual
property. Once considered mere economic rights like property, the
debate about how to allocate IP resources was as uncontentious as
whether Congress can regulate the interstate dairy industry with its
plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.16 Now, however, to
read and understand Supreme Court cases about IP as debating
something other than property, something instead akin to civil rights of
equal dignity, we recognize in them deeply rooted and still contentious
debates over segregation, discrimination, and freedom from the
arbitrary and unaccountable will of others as a path towards
egalitarianism.
When these equality debates concern access for women to an allmale school, for example, lawyers understand immediately the
implication of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The
implication of the equal protection clause in these situations triggers
recognizable and long-standing doctrinal analyses.
When the law at issue is not drawn along so-called “suspect” or
“quasi-suspect” lines, however, e.g., regarding categorizations of race,
religion, or gender, the acceptable doctrinal analysis under the equal
protection clause is deferential judicial review. The court’s job is to ask
only if the distinction in the law is rationally related to some legitimate
purpose showing deference to the legislative line-drawing and the
democratic processes that gave rise to the legislation in the first
instance. What this means is that “equal protection of the laws” does not
require that all people or entities be treated the same, only that likes be
treated alike or that when they are not, a rational basis exist for
15. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding
7-2 that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner’s reasons
for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause but
refraining from deciding whether Colorado’s public accommodation law requires the baker to treat
the same-sex the same as an opposite-sex couple).
16. See US v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1939).
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differential treatment.17 This is the rule against arbitrariness. When
differential treatment is justified, the differences are just that; they do
not impose status hierarchies or perpetuate abuses of power but instead
are distinctions rationally relied upon to promote orderly economic
relations.
So, for example, when opticians are treated differently than
ophthalmologists for the purposes of state licensing requirements, or
when a federal law blesses “pure” dairy products but bans “impure”
dairy products, we ask whether this differential treatment violates the
presumptive rule of formal equality (all eye doctors or dairy products
should be treated the same). 18 We ask whether differential treatment is
justified by some rational basis. Intellectual property regulations are
considered to embody economic rights and policy and thus would fall
under rational basis scrutiny. As such, the Court largely defers to the
lines drawn by Congress promoting or limiting intellectual property as
long as a hypothetical rational basis exists for the categories and the
differential treatment at issue.
Deference to the democratic legislative rational disappears when
the law distinguishes on the basis of “suspect” or “quasi-suspect”
categories, e.g., on the basis of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or
gender. In these circumstances, equality law developed to more strictly
scrutinize democratic decision-making out of concern that democratic
rule has failed a historically disadvantaged group for arbitrary reasons
or is otherwise perpetuating long-standing and irrational prejudice that
degrades people on the basis of class membership or identity. This
“strict scrutiny” requires a court’s searching review of the legislative
rationales to root out invidious discrimination,19 such as White
Supremacy and misogyny, both which structure political, social, and
economic institutions to keep people of color and women on the
margins of power and opportunity. In these cases, courts demand from
lawmakers a higher justification for the law and the lines it draws. In
doing so, courts look for the perpetuation of status hierarchies for their
own sake in which differences are stigmatized as markers of

17. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
18. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding differential treatment of
opticians from ophthalmologists is ordinary economic legislation and does not violate equal
protection clause); cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 154 (holding that federal law banning impure
dairy products from interstate commerce does not violate due process or equal protection).
19. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-11
(1976).
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inferiority.20 The rightful disdain of caste systems in which hierarchies
perpetuate humiliation and shame for those with relatively little power
or status motivates this equal protection analysis.
This equality reasoning originates with the dissent from the
grotesque error in Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld legally mandated
racial segregation as a reflection of consensual custom instead of a
humiliating and oppressive practice that implied the social inferiority of
Black people.21 Plessy was later reversed and corrected in Brown v.
Board of Education, which defines equality as freedom from legally
sanctioned hierarchy and subordination that create “unacceptable
degrees of control over the lives of others.”22 This reasoning, conjoining
freedom and equality, also celebrates choice and consent of free and
equal people as a measure of a just society. Ideally, just legal regimes
facilitate free choice and mutual consent between otherwise
independent actors, developing self-determination and equal dignity
while avoiding unjust subordination.
Two controversial copyright cases decided a decade apart exhibit
these doctrinal strands of equal protection law. These cases are
controversial because both extended and strengthened copyright
protection against a backdrop of an expanding digital age in which the
swelling scope of copyright threatens speech and behavior on the
internet. They are also controversial because as opportunities for
speech and creativity grow in the digital age, copyright law’s incentive
rationale (that exclusivity is necessary to promote expression and its
dissemination) is less persuasive when applied to the expanding
breadth of works to which copyright law now pertains. Finally, the cases
are controversial because of weak reasoning and fractured opinions
that speak past each other.23 As I explain below, a better way to
understand these cases is not as debating the scope of copyright law as
20. “The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one: what is objectionable is being
marked as inferior to others in a demeaning way. . . . [I]t is not the tasks themselves that members
of lower casts are assigned to perform that are demeaning – they may be necessary tasks that
someone has to perform in any society. The problem is that they are seen as beneath those in higher
castes. The remedy in such cases is to abolish the social system that defines and upholds such
distinctions between superior and inferior.” T.H. Scanlon, When Does Equality Matter?, 8 (2004).
21. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana Law segregating train travel
by race as consistent with the equal protection clause because it treats both black and white
passengers the same).
22. Scanlon, supra note 20, at 9.
23. For critique of Eldred, see Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property
after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547, 547-550, n. 7) (2003) (citing others). For
critique of Golan, see Howard B. Abrams, Eldred, Golan and Their Aftermath,
60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 491 (2013).
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a matter of ordinary economic policy, but instead about the role of
equality between people regarding copyright’s burdens and
beneficiaries, an increasingly relevant concern in the digital age when
copying fuels the internet and copyright can restrict access.
II. FORMAL EQUALITY AND LIKES TREATED ALIKE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
Eldred v. Ashcroft concerns the rationality of congressional
legislation called the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the CTEA),
passed at the end of the decade that witnessed the birth of the internet
and the world wide web.24 The CTEA extended the copyright term
twenty years, from life of the author plus fifty years (as enacted in 1976),
to life of the author plus seventy years.25 A central question in the case
was whether Congress had a rational basis for adding the twenty years
and, relatedly, whether the enlarged term could permissibly apply to
existing and future copyrights alike.26 Justice Ginsburg, writing for seven
members of the Court, held that Congress did have a rational basis for
the twenty-year extension and for its equal application to both existing
and future copyrights and copyright holders.27
The controversy around Eldred centers largely on the fact that few
people believe that twenty extra years of copyright protection adds any
incentive to authors or owners to create or disseminate creative works,
the primary reasons for which copyrights are granted.28 Those
disbelieving the Court’s reasoning would be forgiven for their
skepticism given that Disney Corporation led the lobbying push for this
legislation in order to protect Mickey Mouse (in his earliest incarnation
as Steamboat Willie) from falling into the public domain in 1998. Also,
the legislation was sponsored by representative Sonny Bono, a man who
became wealthy from the sales of his music. But rather than dig into the
legislative history to discern whether the evidence and factual record
supported a finding of sufficient incentives for more than the Disney
24. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) of 1998, which amended the durational provisions of the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302,
304 (1998)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 204, 231.
27. Id. at 194.
28. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating that “the primary
objective of copyright” is ‘“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The
economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors . . . .”).
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Corporation and musical celebrities, the Court traveled its usual and
customary path when considering the rationality of ordinary economic
legislation. It deferred to Congress, the relevant democratic body, saying
“it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue
the Copyright Clause’s objectives” of promoting progress of science and
the useful arts.29
This is a correct statement of law and legal history. And, there was
some evidence before Congress—albeit self-serving and exaggerated
evidence—suggesting that the extension of copyright by twenty years
would benefit authors and publishers and encourage both to invest in
more creative work.30 Musicians such as Bob Dylan and Carlos Santana
gave testimony before Congress that said an extra twenty years would
“assur[e] . . . fair compensation for themselves and their heirs [and thus]
was an incentive to create.”31 The Motion Picture Association of
American, of which Disney is a member, said that copyright term
extension would “provide copyright owners [by which the MPAA means
their studio members] generally with the incentive to restore older
works and further disseminate them to the public.”32 And Senator Orrin
Hatch argued that given “increasing longevity and the trend toward
rearing children later in life, [copyright term extension will] provide
adequate protection for American creators and their heirs” otherwise
the “U. S. copyright term [will fail] to keep pace with the substantially
increased commercial life of copyrighted works resulting from the rapid
growth in communications media.”33 Even without such evidence,
however, the Court properly exercises deferential judicial review of
ordinary economic legislation when it presumes the existence of such
facts and when there is no evidence of legislative irrationality (such as
prejudice), the targeting a suspect class (race or gender), or the
burdening of a fundamental right. In these exceptional cases, the Court
would abandon deference and engage in strict scrutiny of the legislative
purpose and effect.34
29. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
30. Id. at 255-257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 207 n.15.
32. Id. at 207 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105–452, at 4 (1998))
33. Id. at 207 n.14. See also Brief for Motion Picture Association of America as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 14-20, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (arguing that films are
fragile and restoration is expensive such that longer terms will incentivize more restoration by
facilitating recuperation of investment in that restoration process).
34. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980). Notably, Justice Breyer suggests the level
of scrutiny should be more than rational basis because the copyright extension intrudes on speech
and raises First Amendment concerns. Id. at 244. Were this position to have prevailed, the lack of
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There was another complaint about Eldred aside from the absence
of sufficient or rational basis for the twenty-year extension. The Court’s
reasoning exposed the possibility of perpetual copyright protection
which would violate the Constitution’s “limited times” provision in the
IP clause: Congress has the power “to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”35 If
Congress could extend by twenty years both existing and future
copyrights on the self-serving statement of certain wealthy copyright
owners who had a seat at Congress’s table, what prevents Congress from
extending copyright indefinitely through a series of incremental
extensions over time (which is precisely what has happened to
copyright beginning with the first 1790 statute, which granted a mere
fourteen year term).36 To this, the Court majority had little to say except
that what it (and Congress) were aiming for in its application to future
and present copyright authors alike was “parity” and
“evenhanded[ness].”37 This is where the equality rationale resurfaces in
a surprising new formulation for intellectual property law.
The majority held that “[i]n that 1998 legislation, as in all previous
copyright term extensions, Congress placed existing and future
copyrights in parity. In prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress
acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional
limitations.”38 Doing so, the Court sidestepped the perpetual copyright
problem altogether, except to say that 70 years is not perpetual and
perpetual copyright would violate the “limited times” provision. And it
justified its retroactive application of the longer copyright term with the
moral force of the value of “equal treatment.” As long as Congress acts
to promote equality in the copyright field among existing and future
copyright holders the same – or “alike,” “evenhandedly,” or “in parity”
(however the Court describes the similar treatment) – the Court says it
trusts congressional decision-making. Notably, Justice Breyer in his
dissent accepts for the purposes of argument that “it is not ‘categorically
evidentiary support that both existing and future copyright holders are incentivized by the twentyyear extension might have doomed the Act.
35. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198-99 (quoting CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
36. See STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th CONG., STUD. ON DURATION OF COPYRIGHT(Comm.
Print 1957) (detailing extension of copyright term from 14 years for the first Copyright Act in 1790
to 56 years as of 1957 (28 years plus a renewal term of 28 years)),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf. The 1976 Act changed copyright term
to life of the author plus fifty years. The CTEA extended it to life of the author plus seventy years.
37. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200, 208.
38. Id. at 194.
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beyond Congress’ authority’ to ‘exten[d] the duration of existing
copyrights’ to achieve such parity.”39
One could understand Justice Ginsburg’s majority decision in
Eldred as about recognizing and protecting the class of copyright
holders that deserve equal treatment to avoid a violation of bedrock
formal equality law demanding that similarly situated people (and
things) be treated the same. Indeed, long-standing copyright law from
1903 prohibits discrimination among copyright holders, holding that
“high” and “low” art are similarly situated with regard to the exclusive
rights copyright law provides.40 Eldred may therefore be simply an
extension of this century-old anti-discrimination principle. Simply
counting the number of times the Eldred opinion uses words
synonymous with “equality” reveals the Court’s focus on similar
treatment. The first paragraph ends with the sentence, “Congress
provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future
copyrights alike.”41 The third paragraph states again that “Congress
placed existing and future copyrights in parity.”42 It then concluded by
saying “[i]n prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress acted within
its authority.”43 The opinion repeats the words “alike,” “parity,” and
“alignment” or “aligned” nearly a dozen times. If we add references to
“matches,” “equity,” “harmony,” “evenhandedly,” and “same[ness],”
which also pepper the decision, the prominence of equal protection
thinking in this copyright opinion emerges clearly.
Other than linguistic choices, Ginsburg focused on the individual
authors themselves and their expectations for equal legal treatment. She
insisted throughout the opinion that current copyright holders are
reasonable to expect they will be treated like future copyright holders
should new legal benefits arise, because that is what has always
happened.44 She also explained that Congress’ extension of copyright
terms ensures the equal treatment of American authors to foreign
authors under the Berne Convention.45 Personalizing the equal

39. Id. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
41. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 205-206 (“Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same
copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.”).
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treatment—its present expectation and its future effect globally—
paints this case not about monetary incentives to create or disseminate
creative work but about the dignity of equal treatment as a social value
absent a good reason to deviate. In other words, although the decision
reads as the classic deference to congressional decision-making under
Congress’ plenary powers concerning ordinary economic legislation,
Ginsburg’s opinion evoked her continuing mission of equal treatment
for persons under the law. Writing for the majority, she could see no
plausible reason to treat some copyright holders differently from
others, be it current versus future copyright owners or American versus
foreign copyright authors. This was in part because of the strength of
similar treatment, or formal equality, as a constitutional value.
But reliance on formal equality to govern the outcome of this case
disregards the history of copyright legislation, its captured process
subject to special interest lobbying, and the democratic principles of fair
process and open institutions on which procedural fairness is based.
The tortured history of special interest copyright legislation is welldocumented.46 Jessica Litman’s book Digital Copyright explains how U.S.
copyright legislative reform has been led largely by the strong-copyright
advocates: the big six movie studios (the MPAA), the music recording
industry (the RIAA), and the text publishing industry (the Author’s
Guild).47 Litman argues that captured legislative process concerning
copyright helps an elite group of copyright holders and harms the
everyday audience of copyright users and creators. (In today’s parlance
we might call the beneficiaries of these legislative reforms “the one
percent.”) This is a far cry from equal treatment, and it is camouflaged
by democratic flag waiving.
Litman warned that if the past legislative process is predictive of
the future, copyright spoils will be only for the wealthy and powerful,
and its predominant form of digital copyright (the majority of
expression today) will suffocate the constitutional mandate for
“progress of science and the useful arts” that requires wide distribution
of and access to creative expression. Justice Breyer’s Eldred dissent does
not mention this critical legislative history but does say that
“congressional action under the Copyright/Patent Clause demonstrates
46. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (providing history of the 1998 copyright legislation);
BILL HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY (2014)
(providing a history of the DMCA, the CTEA and SOPA/PIPA in particular).
47. Litman, supra note 46. See also ARAM SINNREICH, THE PIRACY CRUSADE: HOW THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S
WAR ON SHARING DESTROYS MARKETS AND ERODES CIVIL LIBERTIES (2013).
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that history . . . does not provide the ‘volume of logic,’ necessary to
sustain the . . . [Act’s] constitutionality.”48 Indeed, as both dissents
explain, the formal equality logic of equal treatment appears to be a ruse
benefitting only 2% of copyright holders. Those beneficiaries’ estates
may profit 50 years after the author’s death from the extended copyright
term, but it is manifestly unlikely the extra years of copyright did or will
incentivize the production or further dissemination of the creative work
produced.49
In this light, the equal treatment justification for the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act melts away. As it turns out, very few
people actually supported the CTEA. It was a compromise struck by
digital platform intermediaries, building their commercial presence on
the internet, and content companies, such as the MPAA and the RIAA,
whose copyright assets traveled farthest and fastest on those digital
networks. In exchange for agreeing to the twenty year copyright term
extension, the digital intermediaries received immunity for certain
kinds of unauthorized uses on-line pursuant to a law passed later the
same year called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the DMCA).
The motivation for record companies and music publishers was
clear enough; the former wanted to reduce the number of illicit
digital copies competing with their official recordings, and the
latter wanted another source of licensing revenues. Technology
companies supported the bill – not on principle, but because they
wanted to design and sell their products without being sued.50

The result of a captured legislative process is copyright law that
entrenches moneyed interests.51 Far from treating people the same, the
CTEA (and its sibling the DMCA) was a backroom deal later justified by
the Court as democratic and reflecting equal treatment.
Justice Stevens’ dissent is most vocal on this score, and Justice
Breyer adopts the reasoning in full. Justice Stevens’ critique of the parity
argument shifts focus of equal treatment from the class of “authors”
seeking to protect their copyright (content owners, such as the MPAA)
to the public that the Copyright Act was intended to ultimately benefit.
“Ex post facto extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of
wealth from the public to authors, publishers and their successors in
interest. Such retroactive extensions do not even arguably serve either
the purposes of the Copyright/Patent Clause,” which he explained is “to
48. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 233.
49. Id. at 248.
50. Herman, supra note 46, at 35.
51. Id. at 48-52.
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allow the public access to products of [author’s creative activity] after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”52 And later Justice
Stevens says:
the reason for increasing the inducement to create something
new simply does not apply to an already-created work. To the
contrary, the equity argument actually provides strong support
for petitioners. Members of the public were entitled to rely on a
promised access to copyrighted or patented works at the
expiration of the terms specified when the exclusive privileges
were granted. On the other hand, authors will receive the full
benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an
inducement to their creativity, and have no equitable claim to
increased compensation for doing nothing more. 53

Stevens unravels the majority’s parity argument with an expanded
focus on all the beneficiaries of the Copyright Act, demonstrating how
formal equality logic of equal treatment can be easily manipulated by
narrowing the relevant class. Treating “likes alike” – “all” “authors” the
same, in Ginsburg’s argument – ignores all those other people for whom
copyright also exists as well as the flaws in democratic process that
established the benefit. The equal treatment argument thereby
perpetuates the exclusion of a vast public who should be included within
the Act’s application of parity, or, as Breyer names them: “movie buffs
and aging jazz fans, . . . historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists,
database operators, and researchers of all kinds . . .who want to make
the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.”54 The
dissents’ identification of flaws in the underlying justification for the
majority’s equality rationale articulates additional interests for IP’s
constitutional implementation: a public and the public domain. The
dissents do not reject equality as critical to copyright law’s structure,
but instead redraws the lines of class membership and asks explicitly:
who else counts when considering equal treatment?
As the dissents explain, the category of “authors” varies to whom
the twenty-year extension applies. Most authors – 98% of them
according to the dissent’s calculation based on briefs filed in the case –
would not materially benefit from the legislation. And future or aspiring
authors who rely on previous work on which to create new works will
52. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227.
53. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Breyer reiterates this point: “Copyright statutes must serve
public, not private, ends; . . . they must seek ‘to promote the Progress’ of knowledge and learning;
and . . . they must do so both by creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the
related restrictions on dissemination after expiration . . . .” Id. at 247-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 250, (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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be hindered by the extended monopoly. The dissents presage in 2003
how today, decades later, the category of authors to whom the equality
principle should apply continues to expand and be even more relevant
to human relations and productivity in the digital era.55 For example, in
2011, when the Stop On-Line Piracy Act (SOPA) was being debated,
which law had it passed would have strengthened law enforcement
tools to combat online copyright infringement including blocking user
internet access, a successful grassroots movement of everyday internet
users, authors, creators, and innovators, shut down the internet for a
day in protest demonstrating their criticality and their power.56
Movements like this emphasize that authors are not only those who
succeed at earning royalties in exchange for licensed use by established
intermediaries (a very small class of lucky authors). In the internet age
especially, authors are everyday creators and users – or “prosumers” to
borrow Alvin Toffler’s coinage – who depend on access to the vast trove
of expressive works newly accessible from our digital networks in order
to produce and participate in our dynamic and industrious culture.57 As
the Eldred dissents explain, the majority failed to consider these other
copyright stakeholders despite basing its decision on the value of
inclusivity.
As civil rights advocates understand, there is much to criticize
about equality jurisprudence that mechanically recites the benefit of
“equal treatment” without investigating more deeply the relevant
categories of people or things being compared.58 The just application of
formal equality often depends on carefully defining the category of
membership and identifying a starting line to which everyone has the
same access in order to evaluate relevant progress. Justice Ginsburg is
no stranger to this critique given her role in gender and racial equality
55. See Amy Goodman, The SOPA Blackout Protest Makes History, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protestmakes-history (“An unprecedented wave of online opposition to the SOPA and PIPA bills before
Congress shows the power of a free internet.”).
56. BILL HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY 194
(2013).
57. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 27 (1980). See also DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 62
(1995); George Ritzer & Nathan Jurgenson, Production, Consumption, Prosumption: The Nature of
Capitalism in the Age of the Digital ‘Prosumer’, 10 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 13, 17 (2010).
58. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 219 (1989) (describing how
law and society subordinate women to men by defining women as different and thus justifying their
unequal treatment, or by measuring women by male standards and thus justifying women’s
subordination when they don’t match up) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory]. See
also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 123 (1987)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified].
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cases concerning accommodation and affirmative action that
interrogate inequality as a function of disparate origins and inattention
to their relevant differences. But she fails to see its purchase here.
Nonetheless, the debate between the majority and dissents in Eldred
concerning equal treatment illuminates new stakes on which the
argument about IP’s structure and purpose proceeds in the digital age.
III. ANTI-HIERARCHY, ANTI-CASTE: GOLAN V. HOLDER.
This section discusses the Supreme Court case Golan v. Holder as an
example of equality law grounded not in the equal treatment principle
but in the anti-subordination principle. Formal equality or “equal
treatment” is only one aspect of equality analysis. Critical to equality law
is the consideration of social circumstances, opportunities, or freedoms
that are thwarted because not all are treated or created the same, which
may justify disparate treatment. Cases like Golan demonstrate this
layered equality jurisprudence by moving from an equal treatment
analysis to concern over status hierarchies and denigrating castes in the
context of intellectual property disputes that justify special
accommodation or affirmative action. Golan v. Holder rejects a formal
equality analysis (“all authors”) and looks instead to promoting equality
by treating some authors differently (“foreign authors” alone) to undo
the injustice of prior differential treatment or subordination.
Despite attention to unjust subordination, the effect of the Court’s
analysis is to reinstate property relations or a social system that
oppresses people not present to protect their stake in the IP dispute. I
argue that this demonstrates the court’s inadequate attention to the
internet’s complex integration of social relations and economic
opportunities, a feature of our networked age that magnifies both
opportunities and deprivations. Cases like Golan debating the benefits
of IP law show how the interconnectedness of economic and social
policy in the digital age complicates and requires clarification of the
responsibilities we have to each other in terms of “the social conditions
of freedoms . . . need[ed] to function as equal citizens.”59 And yet the
Court’s unrequited paean to anti-subordination equality moved the
debate from market economics to deeply held values of equal dignity
and reflects the centrality of current cultural debates about persistent
inequality and solutions to it in the new era of the internet. When, as the
Golan court explains, past IP rights or limitations are stigmatic markers
59. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS, 287, 320 (1999).
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of inferiority, or when they perpetuated caste-like conditions (the way
race was understood in Brown v. Board of Education), the Court
reorients its analysis from IP being about ordinary economic legislation
to one about identity, personhood, and belonging in a complex
ecosystem aiming to promote creative expression and sustaining
collaborations.
The 2012 decision of Golan v. Holder upholds as constitutional
section 104A of the U.S. Copyright Act, added in 1994 as part of the U.S.
joining the international Berne treaty (the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works). Section 104A grants
copyright protection to certain preexisting works of Berne member
countries previously in the public domain in the U.S. These foreign
works lacked U.S. copyright protection and were in the U.S. public
domain because either the U.S. did not protect works from that country
at the time of their publication or because authors of those works failed
to comply with U.S. statutory requirements. Section 104A’s effect was to
withdraw hundreds of thousands of works from the U.S. public
domain—canonical works such as Prokofiev’s “Peter and the Wolf” and
Edward Munch’s painting “The Scream”—and bring them under U.S.
copyright protection for the remaining portion of their exclusive term.
Many advocates considered section 104A’s shrinking of the public
domain—on which innumerable people rely for education,
entertainment, and commerce—a First Amendment violation and
beyond Congress’ power under the intellectual property clause. The
petitioners in Golan argued that “[r]emoving works from the public
domain . . . violates the ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction by turning a fixed
and predictable period into one that can be reset or resurrected at any
time, even after it expires.”60 This shrinking of the public domain
presented new challenges to freedom of speech. Those opposed to
section 104A drew on the Supreme Court’s statement a decade earlier
in Eldred, that altering the “traditional contours of copyright protection”
warrants heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.61
Heightened scrutiny, sometimes in the form of strict scrutiny, means a
court demands more than a rational justification for the law. Democratic
deference and mere rationality no longer apply when a fundamental
right is at stake. In other words, the Golan petitioners learned their
lesson from the Eldred court’s submissiveness to congressional line60.Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 203, 318-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61.Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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drawing for ordinary economic policy issues. If the Court defers only to
Congress’s ordinary copyright legislation based in economic policy,
Petitioners must show how 104A is extraordinary legislation because it
interferes with the fundamental right of free speech. As such, Congress
would have to justify 104A’s copyright extension with a more rigorous
record of its purported benefits to creative production and
dissemination, a challenge the petitioners thought Congress could not
meet.
But Petitioners focused on the wrong fundamental right. In Golan,
as in Eldred, the Court is not worried about free speech but about
equality. Instead of analyzing the law’s balance of producing more
creative work despite substantially shrinking the public domain, the
Court considers the new equality as justification. The decision begins
with familiar language about formal equality – “sameness” and
“reciprocity” – stating that Section 104A gave to foreign works “the
same full term of protection available to U.S. works” because
“[m]embers of the Berne Union agree to treat authors from other
member countries as well as they treat their own.”62 Justice Ginsburg,
for the majority, understands the United States’ acquiescence to Berne
as a “reciprocat[ion] with respect to . . . authors’ works.”63 The Court
considers the laudable effect of section 104A, despite its diminution of
the public domain, as a “restoration plac[ing] foreign works on an equal
footing with their U.S. counterparts.”64
But the Golan decision goes beyond formal equality of treating likes
alike and reasons to its result by relying on an anti-subordination
principle. The anti-subordination principle is sometimes understood as
competing with anti-classification (or formal) equality.65 Commitment
to anti-subordination reflects a belief that certain distinctions
reproduce or enforce inferior social status, especially of historically
oppressed people. As Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin write,
“[a]ntisubordination theori[es] contend that guarantees of equal
citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social
stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and
practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically

62. Golan, 565 U.S. at 308.
63. Id. at 312.
64. Id. at 315.
65. Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Anti-subordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
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oppressed groups.”66 The anti-subordination rationale, in contrast to
the anti-classification or formal equality principle, allows—and even
encourages—the government to prefer or benefit some groups over
others to remedy past conditions of subordination or deprivation.
Rather than rely on concepts of “sameness” and “difference” for which
relevant differences justify different treatment, an anti-subordination
rationale excoriates the existence and perpetuation of hierarchy that
reinforce both privilege and stigma and justifies treating people
differently to undo such injustices. The Supreme Court’s equality
jurisprudence embraces both anti-subordination equality (affirmative
action) as well as anti-discrimination equality (equal treatment). These
doctrines co-originated after the Civil War when the Freedman’s bureau
provided benefits only to newly freed slaves at the same time as the new
Fourteenth Amendment insisted on a new norm of “equal protection of
the laws.” Constitutional approval of affirmative action has extended
into the 20th century with programs in education and employment that
aim to remediate systemic discrimination and disadvantage by selecting
for and protecting only certain statuses and physical traits historically
targeted, such as race, sex, pregnancy and able-bodiedness.
Consider the case of gender inequality. Under the formal equality
model, women and men are both persons and thus equal, e.g., “the same”
and should be judged by the same criteria, for example when applying
for jobs.67 Conversely, they may also be “different” in some capacity and
thus need not be treated the same, for example when assessing leave
after a child is born.68 Neither approach considers how gender as a social
category constrains or provides opportunities for and access to social,
political and economic benefits on the basis of sex.69 Job criteria may be
the same, but fewer women may be hired because they experience less
access to opportunities that prepare them for the job market because of
gender stereotyping and differential social roles (of child care or career
expectations). Similarly, providing more leave for women after child
birth may make sense because their physical experience of child birth
may require more recovery time, but granting more time to women than
to men may encourage more mothers to stay home with newborns than
66. Siegel & Jack Balkin, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2004).
67. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 33; see also MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist
Theory, supra note 58, at 219.
68. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 33; see also MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist
Theory, supra note 58, at 219.
69. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 58, at 34-39.
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fathers and discourage equal parenting and equal opportunity to return
to and advance at work. “Same” or “different” treatment without regard
to existing gendered social stratification and the reasons for it
reproduces inequality through powerful male-dominated institutions
(the paid workforce) at the expense of women. By contrast, an antisubordination approach to gender inequality identifies the power
instantiated in the labels “male” and “female,” and asks whether the
maintenance of the labels “participates in the systemic social
deprivation of one sex because of sex.”70 As Catherine MacKinnon has
written regarding this form of equality theory:
The only question [for equality] . . . is whether the policy or
practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of
an underclass or a deprived position because of gender
status . . . . The social problem addressed is not the failure to
ignore woman’s essential sameness with man, but the
recognition of womanhood to women’s comparative
disadvantage.71

What does this have to do with the Golan decision and copyright
law? As literary historians and copyright scholars recount, the U.S.
copyright system was rigged against foreign authors from its earliest
days on behalf of the American publishing industry.72 Foreign authors
were disadvantaged as compared to domestic authors regarding
copyright. U.S. copyright was riddled with technical traps unfamiliar to
foreign authors. U.S. copyright law in large part failed to protect foreign
authors (who first published oversees) who sought to publish and sell
their works in the United States. This led to profound imbalances in the
U.S. of the relative cost of works by foreign and domestic authors;
foreign works were cheap to publish because copyright licenses were
not required. These purposeful market asymmetries skewed the
perceived value of, and access to, foreign and domestic works. Foreign
authors were the “women” in this social hierarchy of access to economic
independence and career opportunities. Section 104A was enacted by
Congress to remedy those imbalances – only for foreign authors. It was
enacted, according to Ginsburg’s majority opinion, as affirmative action

70. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
102, 117-118 (1979).
71. Id. at 117.
72. ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 2, 70 (2013); MARK
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 17 (1993).
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to undo or reverse the harm caused by decades of copyright deprivation
for foreign authors and overseas copyright holders.73
According to the Golan majority, fixing the anti-foreign bias in the
U.S. copyright system by reserving benefits only for formerly deprived
foreign authors is justified for two reasons: international harmonization
assures better treatment to U.S. authors abroad and it is a targeted
remedy for the purposeful deprivation of foreign authors’ copyright by
restoring their exclusive rights in the United States. Section 104A did in
fact harmonize the U.S. copyright regime by placing foreign works in the
position they would have occupied if the current non-discriminatory
U.S. regime had been in effect when those works were created and first
published. As the Court states, “[a]uthors once deprived of protection
are spared the continuing effects of that initial deprivation; [section
104A] gives them nothing more than the benefit of their labors during
whatever time remains before the normal copyright term expires.”74
Restoring works to the “position they would have occupied” and
“spar[ing]” authors any further “deprivation” unmistakably resonates
with the language of affirmative action and remedying past unjust
discrimination.75 Indeed, in a footnote, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
accuses the unreformed copyright law (and Justice Breyer’s dissent) of
American exceptionalism and isolationism, a critique resonating with
concerns of cultural dominance (status and stigma) that animate antisubordination equality theory.76
The Golan majority further argues that restoration of copyright and
a focused shrinking of the public domain is a modest reform. Far from
making foreign authors whole (it does not add all the years they lost), it
raises those “deprived” foreign authors to the current status of the U.S.
authors.77 Like the affirmative action doctrine in the gender or race
context, the bestowed “benefit” on the select class—here, copyright of
foreign works whose protection was unavailable under the older
regime—is something that should have previously been conferred, but
73. Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence in the context of race began in 1976 (with
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)) and with gender arguably not until 1996
(with the decision of U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). There has never been a Supreme Court
decision evaluating a gender-based affirmative action plan. U.S. v. Virginia concerned the level of
judicial scrutiny for equality violations on the basis of gender (VMI did not allow women to enroll),
which would also apply to programs that afforded affirmative action to women. See Virginia, 518
U.S. at 530-31.
74. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 334 (2012).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 327 n.28.
77. Id. at 333.
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was otherwise unlawfully or wrongfully withheld. The wrong was the
denial of copyright to foreign authors not because they failed standards
of merit or creativity but to benefit U.S. authors by providing them with
market leverage. Foreign authors were unrepresented in the U.S.
legislative process and thus their denial of copyright that enriched the
purse of U.S. authors without any obvious connection to copyright law’s
goals of promoting the creation and dissemination of creative work
smacks of abuse of power.
Of course, there were benefits to the deluge of uncopyrighted
works by foreign authors into the U.S. public domain. Those works could
be disseminated without license, making them cheaper and more
available to readers (albeit without remuneration to the original
authors). Some say this fact alone explains the prevalence of the
modernist authors from Europe in the U.S. public school curricula for
much of the 20th century.78 Would we have read James Joyce in the
volume we did had the books not been so inexpensive to reproduce and
disseminate? Breyer’s dissent in Golan develops this theme, focusing on
the public domain’s indispensability to education and national culture.79
He also critiques as unfounded and irrational the majority’s argument
that the remediation of the lost copyright and harmonization of both
foreign and domestic rights “promotes the diffusion of knowledge” (a
copyright goal) by incentivizing the republication and restoration of
those works “lost” to the public domain. 80 The dissent argues that
revived copyright for these foreign authors will not promote more of
them or their wider distribution. Indeed, there is recent empirical
evidence that supports this assertion.81 Copyright might disappear all
but the best sellers, leaving the majority of books invisible to the public
until they become public domain material.82 This is an argument that
78. Spoo, supra note 72, at 158-159. Spoo writes about how obscenity law at this time severely
hampered the publishing industry especially when the modernists were writing novels and poems
and short stories with “dirty” words and erotic content. See id. at 182-183. Some obscenity laws
were enforced through the postal service – declaring manuscripts “nonmailable.” Id. Spoo suggests
the “absence of copyright registration records for issues of The Little Review [which contained
many of the early works of Joyce] may be the direct result of the post office’s obscenity
suppressions. Nonmailable issues could not readily have been deposited in the Copyright Office.
Once the magazine had acquired the stigma of obscenity, moreover, the register of copyrights has
a plausible ground for effusing to register claims of copyright in the issues . . . .” Id.
79. Golan, 565 U.S. at 354.
80. Id. at 345.
81. Imke Reimers, Copyright and Generic Entry in Book Publishing, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS
1, 2 (2019) (showing that copyright expiration promoted the works availability); Paul Heald, How
Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829, 830 (2014).
82. Heald, supra note 81, at 830.
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104A’s restoration or affirmative action does more harm than good
from a copyright perspective and that attention should be paid when
protecting status and erasing stigma anchor IP policy, which is typically
geared to progressing economic and cultural production.
The Golan majority decisively rejects the public domain benefits of
the U.S. copyright regime that left so many foreign works unprotected
because, the Court argued, equality is worth the costs to users. In
making this argument, the majority analogizes to a well-understood
equality harm of pay discrimination:
The question here . . . is whether would-be users must pay for
their desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their
exploitation to “fair use” of that work. Prokofiev’s Peter and the
Wolf could once be performed free of charge; after §514 [Section
104A] the right to perform it must be obtained in the
marketplace. This is the same marketplace, of course, that exists
for the music of Prokofiev’s U.S. contemporaries: works of
Copland and Bernstein, for example, that enjoy copyright
protection, but nevertheless appear regularly in the programs of
U.S. concertgoers.83

This analogy resonates with the rhetoric of “equal pay for equal
work,” the slogan used for the Equal Pay Act of 1963 that continues to
be marshaled in support of the Paycheck Fairness Act, first introduced
in 1997 and re-introduced every two years since but never passed. On
the surface, Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning for the Golan majority makes
sense: why value Copland’s work higher than Prokofiev’s? If there is no
difference between the works by copyright standards, why must one be
paid for while the other is free? Absence of a rational basis leaves open
the possibility of irrational or invidious purposes. And indeed, Justice
Ginsburg critiques the unreformed U.S. copyright law as xenophobic and
U.S.-centric that purposely devalues and excludes foreign works in
order enrich national authors. To her, there is no good justification for
the stigmatic and material harm arising from this scheme.
But contrary to equal pay laws, which have no losers except the
employers for whom antidiscrimination policies may be expensive, the
dissent in Golan argues that section 104A causes real harm to a diffuse
and vulnerable public. Those who rely on the stability and existence of
public domain material, such as educators, researchers, fledgling artists
and authors, are now forced to pay where they had not previously. The
Golan majority and dissent dispute the relevance and importance of the
83. Golan, 565 U.S. at 333; but see Spoo, supra note 72, at 143, 303 n.148 (questioning whether
American authors were held back by European competition).
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public domain to cultural production, expressive freedoms and
community development, that is, to “progress” writ large. The dissent
claims the public domain is a resource relied upon as of right with
constitutional importance. As previously mentioned, some literary and
legal scholars have argued that the U.S. publishing industry’s “piracy” of
European works shaped the American and European literary culture.
Without the “burden” of copyright protection, foreign authors such as
James Joyce, Ezra Pound, Djuna Barnes and even Gilbert and Sullivan
evaded U.S. government censors and enriched their celebrity through
lower prices and saturated U.S. markets, which led the global market for
these works.84 Because many of these works were intellectually
challenging or even obtuse to American readership, their prevalence in
the U.S. marketplace given their affordability and lack of regulation very
likely facilitated widespread acceptance and celebration. Whether this
justifies the “subordination” of foreign authors to U.S. authors is an
important question the decision does not address. This is because the
majority describes the U.S. public domain as “unowned” and thus less
protected or important than personal property such as copyright and
thereby easily elevates equality and anti-subordination as the
predominate concerns.85 When there is no public good at stake other
than that produced by copyright ownership per the majority opinion,
equality concerns with regard to that ownership can take priority.
The majority’s equal pay argument is laudable in the context of pay
discrimination cases in which similarly situated workers are paid less
because of irrelevant differences (such as gender or race). But in the
copyright context this argument speaks past the dissent’s concern that
the public domain be constant or growing and that shrinking the public
domain thwarts copyright’s goals of “progress” measured by access to
expressive works and opportunities for creative production. The
majority’s argument assumes a financial benefit exists for authors
whose copyright revives under 104A, which may encourage further
publication and dissemination of those works. To the dissent and many
commentators, this position is laughable. For the most part, works not
under copyright disseminate freely and are accessible.86 By contrast,
works once in the public domain and now under copyright due to Golan
may be stalled from dissemination and republication precisely because
permission is now required and may be expensive. The majority and
84. Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1817 (2009).
85. See Golan, 565 U.S. at 325 n.26, 331.
86. Heald, supra note 81, at 855.
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dissent are debating what “progress” means in this case: equal status
under copyright law (but without a guarantee of remuneration) or a
stable and nurtured public domain, even if that comes at a loss of control
to copyright owners.
Golan majority’s unconvincing reliance on copyright’s financial
benefit to justify foreign copyright restoration belies its true focus,
which is the dignity deprived European authors by being excluded from
the legal regime of authorial control.87 Foreign authors who lacked U.S.
copyright and sought to be published in the U.S. with some hope of
copyright-like revenue had to devise creative business solutions. Some
issued alternative versions of their work so “first publication” of this
“new” work would in fact be in the U.S.88 Others struck precarious
publishing deals on a handshake without the enforceability of law.
These additional hurdles required for foreign authors simply to
participate in the same market as U.S. authors was insulting and
degrading. Working twice has hard for less control or pay is a
professional affront in other contexts (such as gender or race
discrimination situations). Indeed, authors such as James Joyce, Ezra
Pound, and T.S. Eliot were vocal and organized around the unfairness of
U.S. copyright law to non-U.S. authors and fought the system to control
the form and manner in which their work was published and
disseminated in the U.S.89 These and other authors signed Joyce’s
“protest” accusing certain American publishers of being “get-rich-quick
promoter[s]” by benefitting from “the innocent connivance of American
law.”90 The Golan majority echoes these sentiments without dwelling on
the literary characters or history and draws on the general
characterization of dignity harms foreign authors experience from the
earlier U.S. copyright regime.
In other contexts, the harm of anti-subordination is obvious.
Women who cook do so as wives and mothers without pay, men who
cook do so as chefs to fame and fortune. Men are doctors and women are
nurses, where the former is high paying and provides more autonomy
and prestige.91 There is nothing inherently “beneath” a person to do
87. Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV.
OF ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 4 (2013).
88. Spoo, supra note 78, at 74, 280 n.10.
89. Id. at 116-153 (detailing Ezra Pound’s legal battles against US copyright law).
90. Id. at 168, 186.
91. Where the opposite is true and doctors are predominantly women, as in Russia, being a
physician is not as prestigious or well-paying a job. See, e.g., Aditi Ramakrishnan et al., Women’s
Participation in the Medical Profession: Insights from Experiences in Japan, Scandinavia, Russia and

AGAINST PROGRESS

306

5/26/2020 6:31 PM

CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 19:3

laundry and change bed linen – it is likely the vast majority of us do it –
but over centuries those who have done so for others are perceived to
be part of an underclass as maids, servants, or even as enslaved persons.
The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one:
what is objectionable is being marked as inferior to others in a
demeaning way. . . . [I]t is not the tasks themselves that members
of lower casts are assigned to perform that are demeaning – they
may be necessary tasks that someone has to perform in any
society. The problem is that they are seen as beneath those in
higher castes. The remedy in such cases is to abolish the social
system that defines and upholds such distinctions between
superior and inferior.92

The identity and status of “author” is subject to the same structural
analysis: when are authors valued as “authors” under copyright and
when are they excluded despite doing the same work as legal authors?
The Golan majority and other Supreme Court opinions from the recent
past appear to draw on this equality critique, identifying unjust
hierarchies in the distribution of IP benefits and burdens anchored in
status and subordination. Their underlying effect is to elevate the status
of authorship in the digital age worthy of this values-based critique. But
doing so without concern for critical function of the public domain for
all people, especially subsequent and developing authors who rely on
the public domain, may miss an opportunity for larger structural reform.
When amplifying anti-subordination causes, it is often too easy to
reinstate property relations that oppress those not present to protect
their equity stakes and social status. This was the case in Golan
regarding all who routinely rely on the public domain. This is especially
problematic given the internet’s integration of social relations and
economic opportunities; failing to account for absent and diffuse
stakeholders who rely on access to the public domain that is vastly
improved by the digital era doubly oppresses them in today’s
networked society. The majority’s copyright bean-counting solution –
simply give more copyright to more people to undo the subordination –
triggers the dissent’s response that the public domain has value too.
Fair enough, but that imagines the copyright pie as a zero-sum resource,
balancing allocations like a finite amount on a scale. But that is not how
copyright works. It is not how anti-subordination equality works either.
Eastern Europe, 23 J. Women’s Health 927, 930 (2014) (describing how women are a majority of
physicians in the former USSR, and the prestige of the profession declined and was one of the
poorest-paid professional occupations. “Simultaneously, women were encouraged to work as
physicians in this new landscape, resulting in the feminization of the profession.”).
92. Scanlon, supra note 20, at 8.
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Describing copyright exclusivity and the public domain as opposites of
the IP coin leaves the public domain as copyright’s negative as opposed
to a fundamental baseline of all intellectual property regimes.93 A
different solution to those injured by the unreformed copyright law
would have been reparations to the injured class paid for by those who
became rich from the free works and also a declaration requiring fair
treatment going forward. Shrinking the public domain and hurting all
who rely on it to pay for past injuries to authors aggrieved by the public
domain’s fecundity is affirmative action that perpetuates the injury of
exclusivity and hierarchy under the guise of inclusivity and equality.
The risk that affirmative action aiming to undue past unjust
discrimination may paradoxically perpetuate inequality of status and
opportunity is the reason the Supreme Court strictly reviews such plans
when they are based on race and gender. When they are based on
copyright, however, as the legislation in Golan was, the Court is not
doctrinally required and thus misses the chance to ask the hard
questions of legislative rationales. Despite importing commendable
equality jurisprudence into copyright law, which is typically an ordinary
economic policy matter for Congress, the Court does not go far enough
with its anti-subordination logic. Doing so would have exposed and thus
more ably considered copyright law not only as market regulation
producing economic chits and fungible assets but as social and civil
rights legislation generating and sustaining a public resource and
fundamental rights. There is a reason equality law, be it based on antidiscrimination or anti-subordination, is complex and contentious
especially at the Supreme Court. It is rooted in deeply-felt convictions
based on centuries of historical experience about what equal treatment
and equal dignity means and what is required from individuals and
government to promote both. As the Supreme Court begins to adopt
more of this equality reasoning and history in its IP decisions, we may
therefore see more contentious disputes reconceiving copyright, for
example, as a feature of the new century that plays a central role
progressing human welfare through fundamental human rights. As the
Supreme Court has traditionally been the protector of those rights
against the tyranny of the majority and legislative overreach, it may
begin a closer investigation of the Constitution’s “progress” mandate in
93. Abraham Drassinower, Copyright is Not About Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 108, 1120, 118-19
(2012) (describing how copyright has a bilateral structure mirroring the correlativity of a private
law action refuting the possibility that copyright’s public domain isn’t essential to its internal
structure).
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terms of the affordances of shared, networked connectivity in our
irrevocable and bittersweet digital age.
CONCLUSION
The resurgence of equality concerns in Supreme Court cases about
IP is not only because equality concerns are in the air with new civil
rights movements driven by digital communication and activism
gaining traction – think only of #MeToo, BlackLivesMatter, and the
LGBTQ civil rights movement. The rise of equality logic in Supreme
Court cases about IP is also because IP is fundamental to and deeply
influencing everyday life in ways unforeseen in decades past. With
copying and sharing technology at the fingertips of anyone with a cell
phone, the digital age has changed how IP regulation works or doesn’t
work. Control over IP may be more difficult, its economic significance
arguably higher or more apparent, and the restrictions IP regulation
affects more severe in terms of costs to consumer and access to cultural
works and useful inventions (such as books and medicine). The digital
age has, in fact, changed so many of our baseline expectations regarding
resource access and allocation, community formation, membership and
influence as well as the transparency, truthfulness and accessibility of
information. Why should it be surprising, then, that the Supreme Court’s
resolution of issues concerning IP not only describe economic efficiency
and wealth accumulation as one of IP’s goals, but also the promotion of
fairness, anti-subordination, and pluralism in a deeper analysis over the
purpose and proper application of IP laws.94
But the Court’s constrained economic analysis based on property
ownership anchored in pre-digital era categories underappreciates the
changes the digital age has wrought to authorship, creativity, and
human flourishing that are in need of renewed legal attention. The
Court’s narrow view of IP’s stakeholders also constrains opportunities
to meaningfully participate in politics and society through digital
networks and markets that might generate the democratic ideal on
which the Court bases its reasoning. But as Plessy came sixty years
94. It is not enough to say utilitarian analysis will maximize whatever good is chosen, e.g. efficiency
is a form of justice. “A fair price in law is not necessarily the same as an efficient or wealth
maximizing price in economics. . . justice, fairness, equity, reasonableness, and equality are not the
subject of mathematical calculus: they are values formed from the human experience of living in
community with others. If such concepts . . . are simply translated into economic equivalent of
efficiency and wealth maximization, they lose much of their social and cultural meaning.” Robin
Paul Malloy, An Interpretive Critique of an Economic Analysis of Law 3-5 (unpublished paper) (Mar.
2, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572497.
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before Brown, and with Brown came a new opportunity to pursue racial
justice for the twentieth century, maybe at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we are living through an IP civil rights era. Perhaps the
transformative IP decisions are yet to come. In any case, the equality
interests the Supreme Court debates in these IP cases highlight renewed
and urgent concerns regarding social progress and the public good now
that the internet age is out of its infancy.

